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BENIGN NEGLECT* OF RACISM IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Angela J. Davis** 
MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA. 
By Michael Tonry. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. 
xii, 233. $25. 
In October 1995, two black male teenagers were shopping in a 
clothing store in Prince George's County, Maryland. A white se-
curity guard, who was also an off-duty police officer, approached 
one of the teens and questioned him about the shirt that he was 
wearing. The youth explained that he had bought the shirt in that 
same store the previous week. Even though a black cashier in the 
store tried to convince the guard that she remembered the teen 
buying the shirt the previous week, the guard demanded to see the 
receipt. After the youth told the officer that the receipt was at 
home, the guard insisted that the boy remove the shirt, leave it in 
the store, and go home to retrieve the receipt. The humiliated teen 
removed his shirt in the store, went home without a shirt, and found 
the receipt. The shirt was eventually returned to him.1 
Just two months later, in December 1995, members of the same 
Prince George's County Police Department observed three adults 
sitting in a car smoking crack cocaine. The scene would not have 
been particularly unusual but for the presence of an infant in the 
car. However, the response of the police officers proved even more 
shocking than the presence of the baby. The officers went over to 
the car, escorted the adults and the child to a local substation, 
talked with them, and allowed them to go home. No arrest was 
* "Benign neglect" was a policy proposed to President Richard M. Nixon in 1970 by then 
Assistant Secretary of Labor Daniel Patrick Moynihan, suggesting that the federal 
government did not need to subsidize civil rights because of the educational gains that 
African Americans had made at that time. See Charles Sumner Stone, Jr., Thucydides' Law 
of History, or from Kerner, 1968 to Hacker, 1992, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1711, 1719 (1993). 
** Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University. B.A. 1978, 
Howard University; J.D. 1981, Harvard. Former Director, Deputy Director, and staff attor-
ney of the Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia. - Ed. The author would 
like to thank Marc Mauer and Professors Tracey Meares, Charles J. Ogletree, Katheryn 
Russell, and Eric Sirulnik for their helpful comments and suggestions. A special thanks is 
owed to Professor Paul Butler for his thoughtful criticism and insights and to Alex Vogel for 
his excellent research assistance. 
1. See Courtland Milloy, Teen Stripped of More than Just a Shirt, WASH. PoST, Nov. 15, 
1995, at Dl, D5. 
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made, and no charges were filed. The officers were white and so 
were the crack smokers.2 
On January 8, 1996, a young black nursing student was driving 
her car on Interstate 95 in South Carolina when a white South Car-
olina State Trooper pulled her over. The trooper approached her 
car with his gun drawn, yanked the door open, dragged her out, and 
threw her onto the ground face down, while constantly cursing and 
screaming at her. He eventually handcuffed her and placed her 
under arrest. Her crime? Driving fifteen miles per hour above the 
speed limit.3 
Each incident, in its own way, illustrates race discrimination in 
the criminal justice system.4 Few people would doubt that the black 
skin of the te~nager in the clothing store played a significant role in 
the officer's decision to stop and question him.5 Although the inci-
dent did not result in an arrest, one wonders what would have hap-
pened if the innocent youth had declined to obey the security 
guard's demands.6 Would the officer have verbally or physically 
2. See Courtland Milloy, Unequal Justice in P.G.?, WASH. PoST, Feb. 25, 1996, at Bl. 
3. State Trooper Fired in Speeding Incident, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996, at A24. A video 
camera installed on the dashboard of the trooper's car recorded the entire incident. Id. 
4. For a discussion of race discrimination in the criminal process, see generally CoRAMAE 
RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 129-219 (1993); THOMAS M. 
UHLMAN, RACIAL JUSTICE 13 (1979); David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Com-
ment On Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. L.J. 2547 (1995); Charles J. 
Ogletree, Does Race Matter in Criminal Prosecutions?, CHAMPION, July 1991, at 6; Develop· 
ments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472 (1988) [herein-
after Developments in the Law]. 
5. Police officers frequently consider race in deciding whether to stop or detain a suspect. 
See United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 394 n.2 (8th Cir.) (upholding the use of race as a 
factor in the detention of a black male in the airport), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1040 (1992); 
United States v. Richard, 535 F.2d 246, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1976) (finding the presence of two 
black males in a predominately white neighborhood insufficient by itself to constitute prob-
able cause but permissible as one of many factors); United States v. Collins, 532 F.2d 79, 82 
(8th Cir.) (holding that the color of a person's skin may not serve as the sole identifying 
factor but may assist police in narrowing the scope of an identification procedure), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 836 (1976); State v. Dean, 543 P.2d 425, 427 (Ariz. 1975) (holding that police 
may consider race in deciding whether to stop a Mexican in a predominately white middle to 
upper-middle class neighborhood); State v. Ruiz, 504 P.2d 1307, 1307-09 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1973) (deciding that police may stop a person of Mexican descent in an area not frequented 
by Mexicans); see also Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. 
L. REv. 820, 855 (1994) ("Given the history of racial discrimination in law enforcement, 
concern about the 'arbitrariness or bias' of the police as decisionmakers is certainly war-
ranted."). See generally Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision To Detain a Suspect, 93 
YALE LJ. 214 (1983) (discussing and criticizing how police officers consider race as a factor 
in the decision to detain a suspect); Randall S. Susskind, Note, Race, Reasonable Articulable 
Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (1994) (criticizing legal standards that 
allow the use of race as a factor in the decision to stop a suspect); Developments in the Law 
- Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 4, at 1494-1520 (discussing racially-biased po-
lice conduct). 
6. See generally Rachel Karen Laser, Comment, Unreasonable Suspicion: Relying on Re-
fusals To Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1172-85 (1995) (arguing that a per-
son's refusal to consent to a police request does not provide a reasonable basis for detaining 
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abused him? Would he have arrested him?7 What if the boy had 
failed to produce the receipt? Would the officer have stopped a 
similarly clothed white youth? 
The second example involved actual criminality, but the police 
officers exercised their discretion not to arrest the white perpetra-
tors, even though they routinely arrest blacks merely suspected of 
drug activity.8 When a black officer on Prince George County's po-
lice force learned of the incident and questioned the responsible 
officers, a white officer who supervised the incident said that he did 
not arrest the crack smokers because they were white.9 The third 
example resulted in an arrest for speeding, an offense for which po-
lice officers can use the arrest power at their discretion.10 Even if 
the officer had stopped a white motorist for speeding, would he 
have arrested her? Would he have verbally and physically abused 
her? 
These examples also illustrate the impropriety and inaccuracy of 
relying on arrest statistics as evidence of criminality.11 Because the 
arrest process involves so much discretion, arrest statistics may both 
overestimate and underestimate actual criminal behavior. Further-
more, because no uniform method of documenting an officer's deci-
sion not to arrest exists, 12 we cannot know the extent to which such 
decisions skew the arrest statistics currently used as evidence of 
criminality within particular racial groups. Despite these concerns, 
Professor Michael Tonry13 relies on arrest statistics to support his 
that person and noting that African Americans and other minorities would be most affected 
by the consideration of such refusals). 
7. Rude, insulting, and brutal behavior on the part of police officers toward minorities 
may produce a response or protest that quickly leads to an arrest. See MANN, supra note 4, at 
150. 
8. The release of the white suspects occurred during a two-week special operation that 
resulted in the arrest of 76 adults. All of the black adults caught with crack cocaine were 
arrested. The only suspects set free were white. See Milloy, supra note 2, at Bl. 
9. The white officer admitted making this statement but claimed to have been joking. Id. 
10. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth 
Amendment Solution to Unchecked Discretion To Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMP. L. 
REV. 221, 222 (1989). 
11. The Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) published by the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion considers a crime to be "cleared" when at least one person is arrested, charged, and 
turned over to the court for prosecution. See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. 
DEPT. OF JusnCE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN nm UNITED STATES 376 (1994). 
The UCR reports the age, sex, and race of arrestees by crime category. Id. 
12. There has been a dramatic increase in the placement of video cameras in police cruis-
ers. Most of these camera-installation programs have been supported or funded by private 
groups or insurance companies. See Bill Billiter, Video Gift to Police Honors Drunk Driving 
Victim, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1996, at 2; David G. Grant, Police To Use Cameras in Arresting 
Drunken Drivers, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 26, 1996, at CS; Bridgeville Police Department Buys 
Two Cameras for Police Cars, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Feb. 26, 1996, at W2. 
13. Michael Tonry is Sonosky Professor of Law and Public Policy at the University of 
Minnesota and the author of numerous books and other publications on crime and 
sentencing. 
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conclusion that racial bias in the criminal justice system can explain 
only a relatively small part of the problem of the overrepresenta-
tion of black men in the U.S. prison system (p. 3). In his book, 
Malign Neglect: Race, Crime, and Punishment in America, Tonry 
argues that the disproportionate incarceration of African Ameri-
cans was caused primarily by the crime policies of the Reagan and 
Bush administrations. He seeks to "demonstrate why American 
crime control policies from 1980 onward did so little good at such 
great cost and how policies in coming years can do more good at 
less cost and with much less racial disparity" (p. viii). In so doing, 
he makes only passing reference to the significance of police discre-
tion (p. 56) and no mention at all of the effect of prosecutorial dis-
cretion on racial disparities in the criminal justice system.14 
Tonry persuasively argues that the crime policies of the last two 
decades have contributed to the disproportionate incarceration of 
African American men. Instead of seeing these policies as one 
component of the conundrum of race and crime, however, he iden-
tifies them as the primary cause of this complex problem. As a re-
sult, he trivializes the role that racial bias plays in the 
overrepresentation of African-American men in the criminal justice 
system. Although Tonry acknowledges the existence of discrimina-
tion in housing, education, and employment (p. 133), he all but ab-
solves police and other criminal justice officials of discrimination 
against African Americans (p. 50). He makes an exception in the 
area of drug arrests - but even here he maintains that police 
targeting of minority neighborhoods is "tactical" rather than inten-
tionally discriminatory (pp. 105-07). Although he bemoans the 
dearth of literature explaining these police tactics, he does not ex-
press similar concerns about the absence of proof in support of his 
theories about the motives of the "white-shirted-and-suspendered 
officials of the Office of National Drug Control Policy."15 
Tonry's scathing indictment of unnamed crime policy officials in 
the Bush and Reagan administrations contrasts curiously with his 
benign treatment and vindication of police and other criminal jus-
tice officials. His charge that Reagan and Bush administration offi-
cials malignly neglected the effect of the War on Drugs16 on African 
Americans suggests that these officials consciously promulgated 
policies that they knew would result in the incarceration of dispro-
portionate numbers of African Americans. Indeed, one can hardly 
imagine a harsher criticism of these policies than Tonry's descrip-
tion of the War on Drugs as a "calculated effort foreordained to 
increase [the] percentages" of African American prisoners (p. 82). 
14. See infra notes 34-44 and accompanying text. 
15. P. 104; see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text for discussion of these theories. 
16. See infra note 29 for discussion of the War on Drugs. 
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His discussion of the motives of the architects of the War on 
Drugs17 comes close to agreeing with the theories promulgated by 
those who believe that U.S. crime policies and laws make up part of 
a conspiracy or genocidal plot to eliminate African Americans.is 
Despite his failure to acknowledge the significance of day-to-
day racial bias in the criminal process, Tonry's analyses of the dis-
criminatory impact of the crime policies of the Reagan and Bush 
administrations (pp. 3-47), and particularly of the War on Drugs 
(pp. 81-123), are important contributions to the literature on race 
and crime. Tonry also sets forth thoughtful proposals for changing 
current policies to ameliorate the disproportionately adverse treat-
ment of African Americans in the criminal justice system (pp. 181-
209). Had Tonry confined the scope of his book to demonstrating 
how the crime policies of the 1980s failed and how they affected 
black Americans, it would have been more focused and effective. 
Part I of this review describes Tonry's analysis of the crime poli-
cies of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Part II discusses 
Tonry's indictment of the War on Drugs and criticizes his failure to 
acknowledge the effects of discriminatory prosecutorial practices 
and sentencing laws. Part III critiques Tonry's trivialization of the 
significance of race discrimination in the criminal justice system 
more generally. Part IV summarizes Tonry's proposals for change 
and stresses the importance of documenting, examining, and elimi-
nating racial bias in the criminal justice system. 
I. MALIGN NEGLECT - THE CRIME POLICIES OF THE REAGAN 
AND BUSH ERAS 
In Chapter One, Tonry presents his thesis that the crime policies 
of the Reagan and Bush administrations significantly contributed to 
the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans. These 
policies consisted of higher penalties, mandatory minimum 
sentences, expanded use of the death penalty, and increased prison 
construction (p. 19). Tonry states that administration officials made 
many claims to justify these policies - and many that were pa-
tently untrue (p. 19). He challenges three of them in particular: (1) 
that an increase in the use of incarceration would result in a de-
crease in the crime rate (pp. 19-24), (2) that ninety-five percent of 
prisoners committed violent or dangerous offenses (pp. 24-26), and 
(3) that building prisons saves money (pp. 26-28). 
Although Tonry does not identify the architects of the War on 
Drugs that he so harshly criticizes, he names and criticizes two of:fi-
17. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text. 
18. For a discussion of antiblack conspiracy and genocidal theories, see generally Regina 
Austin, Beyond Black Demons & White Devils: Antiblack Conspiracy Theorizing & The 
Black Public Sphere, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1021 {1995). 
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cials of the Bush administration - Steven Dillingham, the Director 
of the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics, and Attor-
ney General William Barr - for promoting prison expansion. Dil-
lingham and Barr claimed that increased imprisonment leads to 
reduced crime rates and that reduced imprisonment results in in-
creased crime rates (p. 20). Tonry argues that both Dillingham and 
Barr attempted to support these conclusions by selectively and de-
ceptively presenting data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Reports 
(p. 22). Tonry skillfully reanalyzes Barr's data and defeats his 
claims that the reduced use of prisons between 1960 and 1970 led to 
a substantial increase in the crime rate and that the 112% increase 
in incarceration between 1980 and 1990 led to a two percent decline 
in the crime rate. For example, Tonry reveals that between 1985 
and 1990, the period during which the U.S. prison population grew 
faster than at any prior point in history, the overall crime rate rose 
by twelve percent, and the violent crime rate rose by thirty-two per-
cent. Through an effective use of charts and graphs, Tonry illus-
trates how Barr focused upon those time periods that supported his 
claims while ignoring others that did not (pp. 22-24). 
Tonry's attack on the second argument made by the Reagan/ 
Bush officials - that ninety-five percent of those in prison commit-
ted dangerous or violent offenses - again shows how they manipu-
lated and deceptively presented statistics. Steven Dillingham 
presented this argument at the 1991 Attorney General's Crime 
Summit. Tonry explains that Dillingham arrived at this phenome-
nal statistic by lumping violent offenders and recidivists together 
despite the fact that many recidivists have committed only nonvio-
lent, minor crimes such as shoplifting, theft, passing bad checks, and 
selling small amounts of marijuana or other drugs (p. 25). Tonry 
then analyzes the 1991 data himself and finds that only 46.6% of 
state prisoners committed violent crimes, and that the remainder 
committed property crimes, drug crimes, or public order crimes (p. 
25). With respect to recidivism, thirty-eight percent had never been 
incarcerated before (p. 25). 
Tonry attacks the third justification for the crime policies - that 
imprisonment saves money - with less detail. Tonry notes that the 
Bush administration relied on a series of cost-benefit analyses of 
prison use conducted by Edwin Zedlewski of the National Institute 
of Justice, John Diiulio of Princeton University, and Mark A.R. 
Kleiman and David Cavanagh of Harvard's Kennedy School of 
Government. In explaining the flaws in these analyses, Tonry fails 
to note the cost of prison construction and prisoner maintenance19 
as well as the cost-effectiveness of reserving existing prison space 
19. See infra note 30. 
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for the most violent offenders, as he does in a later chapter of the 
book (pp. 205-06). 
Tonry sharply criticizes the crime policies of the 1980s for their 
effect on black Americans. He contends that African Americans 
are six to seven times more likely to be in jail or prison than whites, 
despite the fact that the crime rate among blacks has not increased 
proportionally since 1980 (pp. 28-29). He refers to a number of 
studies that investigated the percentages of young black men under 
the control of the criminal justice system in various cities between 
1988 and 1991.20 These percentages, which ranged from twenty-
three percent nationwide to fifty-six percent in Baltimore, Mary-
land, effectively illustrate the gross overrepresentation of young 
black men as criminal defendants, probationers, parolees, and pris-
oners (pp. 29-30). 
One of Tonry's most interesting and compelling arguments is 
that the proponents of the crime policies of the 1980s should be 
held morally responsible for the disproportionate incarceration of 
young black men. This argument marks the beginning of his sting-
ing indictment of the War on Drugs. Tonry grounds his analysis in 
the criminal law doctrines of mens rea and actus reus.21 He states 
that purpose and knowledge are equally culpable states of mind, 
and that a person who intentionally and purposefully kills has the 
same level of culpability as a person who causes a death with some 
other purpose in mind but with the knowledge that a death will 
most certainly occur.22 Employing this mens rea framework, Tonry 
contends that while the architects of the crime reduction policies 
may not have implemented them with the precise purpose of con-
fining large numbers of black men, they knew that such dispropor-
20. For example, the Sentencing Project's 1990 report showed that twenty-three percent 
of black men between the ages of twenty and twenty-nine were in the criminal justice system. 
Seep. 29. The October 1995 update concluded that this percentage had increased to 32.2% 
by 1994. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, YoUNG BLACK AMERICANS AND TIIE CRIMI· 
NAL JusnCE SYSTEM: FIVE YEARS LATER 1 (1995). Tonry also discusses similar reports that 
examined the proportions of young black males in the system in New York State (23%), 
California (33%), Washington, D.C. (42%), and Baltimore, Maryland (56%). See pp. 29-30. 
21. Mens rea refers· to the mental state required for culpability in criminal law: "[A] 
person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negli-
gently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense." MODEL 
PENAL CODE§ 2.02(1) (1962). Actus reus refers to the overt act required for culpability: "A 
person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct that includes a volun-
tary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." Mo DEL PENAL 
CODE § 2.01(1) (1962). 
22. See p. 32. Tonry's criminal law analogy, while powerful, is somewhat overstated. 
With the exception of the Model Penal Code's definition of murder, purpose and knowledge 
generally are not equally culpable states of mind. See MODEL PENAL CODE§ 2.02(2) (1962); 
Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal Liability: The 
Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REv. 681, 694-99 (1983) (distinguishing pur-
poseful and knowing acts). 
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tionate confinement would likely result from their actions. 
Therefore, according to Tonry, they should be held responsible.23 
Tonry reaches a similar conclusion by applying actus reus analy-
sis. The criminal law holds a person responsible for an omission 
only if the person had a duty to act under existing law.24 Dismissing 
this doctrine as retrograde, he argues that a person should be ex-
pected to save or help someone else if she faces no significant risk 
of harm in so doing. Thus, says Tonry, if crime-policy proponents 
could have implemented policies that would not have harmed 
young, black Americans, they should be held morally responsible 
for this omission. 
Tonry anticipates some responses to his argument. For example, 
proponents of the crime policies argue that they responded appro-
priately to the public's demands for harsher penalties for criminals. 
Tonry contends that the politicians themselves prompted this de-
mand when they used the crime issue to secure votes by instilling 
fear and making promises to be "tough on crime" (p. 34). He also 
argues that these politicians dishonestly told the public that crime 
rates were rising when in fact the crime rate for most serious crimes 
fell from 1980 through 1986.25 
Tonry also takes on the claim that poll data confirmed that the 
public wanted tougher crime policies. He notes that responses to 
poll questions usually tum on the form rather than the substance of 
the questions. For instance, when pollsters offer a choice between 
"lenient" and "tough" policies, the responses are predictable. 
Tonry also suggests that people's uninformed first reactions often 
change after they give informed consideration to a problem (p. 35). 
He notes that public opinion data show that although Americans 
want to see offenders punished, they also want to see them rehabili-
tated and would support community-based sentences for many of-
fenders (p. 35). 
Tonry responds next to the argument that the crime policies im-
plemented in the 1980s were not immoral because they did not in-
tentionally discriminate against black Americans. He concedes that 
23. The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 
(1987). McCleskey argued that the State of Georgia violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment when it adopted a capital punishment statute and allowed it to 
remain in effect despite its discriminatory impact on blacks. The Court held that McCleskey 
would have to prove that the legislature adopted the statute " 'because of' not merely 'in 
spite of'" its adverse effects on blacks. 481 U.S. at 298 (quoting Personnel Admr. v. Feeney, 
442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979)). 
24. Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unless: 
(1) the statute defining the offense expressly provides as such; or (2) the law imposes a duty 
to perform the omitted act. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(3) (1962). 
25. Tonry cites data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics of the United States Depart-
ment of Justice to support his argument. See p. 34. 
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since the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis,26 a 
plaintiff must prove intent to discriminate in order to establish a 
constitutional violation.27 He goes on to say, "that a policy is not 
unconstitutional does not make it right, or even not wrong" (p. 35). 
Finally, Tonry deals with the suggestion that black communities 
want these harsh policies because they are disproportionately vic-
timized by crime.28 He maintains that although residents of crime-
stricken neighborhoods understandably request the removal of 
guns, gangs, and drug markets from their neighborhoods, they also 
want solutions to the chronic social and economic problems that 
cause crime in the first place. Applying common sense, he contends 
that the fact that people in these neighborhoods support policies 
that result in the incarceration of some of their neighbors does not 
mean that they would not prefer policies that would make the very 
need for such incarceration less likely (p. 37). 
II. RACE AND THE WAR ON DRUGS 
In Chapter Three, Tonry continues and intensifies his indictment 
of Reagan and Bush administration officials by focusing on the "ar-
chitects" of the War on Drugs.29 In uncompromising language, he 
26. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
27. For arguments criticizing the current equal protection standard, see Sheri Lynn John-
son, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CoRNELLL. REv.1016 (1988); Charles R. 
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987); Todd Rakoff, Washington v. Davis and the Objective Theory of 
Contracts, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 63 (1994); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory 
Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE LJ. 111 (1983). 
See also David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 
1318-19 (1995) (arguing against a single set of equal protection rules). 
28. See Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Com-
ment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255, 1255-61 (1994) (arguing that black communities need more, 
not less, law enforcement because they are disproportionately victimized by crime). But see 
David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of 
Distinction," 83 GEo. LJ. 2547 (1995), for a critique of this view. 
29. See p. 83. Some suggest that President Ronald Reagan launched the modem War on 
Drugs during a speech he delivered at the Department of Justice on October 14, 1982. See, 
e.g., Leslie Maitland, President Gives Plan To Combat Drug Network, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 
1982, at Al. In that speech, Reagan stated that he would do what was necessary to end the 
drug menace. Id. The Justice Department and the Congress cooperated by concentrating 
their efforts on drug-law enforcement. See ATIORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIOLENT 
CruME, OFFICE OF THE ATTY. GENERAL, FINAL REPORT 28 (1981) (recommending an "une-
quivocal commitment to combating international and domestic drug traffic"); UNITED 
STATES CONG., CHARTER OF THE SENATE DRUG ENFORCEMENT CAUCUS (1982) (identifying 
a group of 28 Senators who wish to "establish drug law enforcement as a Senate priority"); 
House Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control, H.R. REP. No. 418, 97th Cong., 2d 
Sess., pts. 1-2, at 50 (1982) (urging the President to "declare war on drugs"). Large amounts 
of federal resources went to the drug-law enforcement effort. See STEVEN WISOTSKY, BE-
YOND THE WAR ON DRUGS: OVERCOMING A FAILED PUBLIC POLICY 5-6 (1990) (discussing 
the increasing involvement of the U.S. military, the FBI, and the CIA in drug intervention 
efforts). In November 1988, President Reagan signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, P.L. 
100-690, 102 Stat. 4181, which established the National Drug Control Policy and created a 
new executive agency with the mandate of stopping illegal drug trafficking and abuse. 
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exposes the failure of the War and castigates its proponents. He 
characterizes the disproportionate incarceration of black Ameri-
cans as "the product of malign neglect of the war's effects on black 
Americans" (p. 115). He even goes so far as to suggest that the War 
was an intentional effort to incarcerate African Americans in large 
numbers (pp. 104, 123). 
Tonry contends that the War on Drugs was a total and abysmal 
failure. In support of this conclusion, he notes that during the War 
cocaine prices fell while street sales and drug use remained steady 
(p. 81). In like manner, arrests doubled; police, prosecution, jail, 
and court costs more than doubled; and prison costs trebled.30 He 
also carries out a cost-benefit analysis that shows that the War's 
costs were tremendous and that it accomplished few if any of its 
goals. 
Tonry presents statistics that graphically illustrate the disparate 
impact of the War on Drugs on African Americans. For example, 
he reveals that by the late 1980s, the rate of black drug arrests was 
five times higher than that of whites, for both adults and juveniles 
(p. 111). He then makes a startling comparison of national data on 
black and white drug arrests: between 1985and1989, white arrests 
increased by twenty-seven percent while black arrests increased by 
115% (p. 113). In Minnesota, drug arrests of whites increased by 
twenty-two percent while drug arrests of blacks increased by an as-
tounding 500% (p. 113). 
Tonry illustrates that these arrest rates bear no relation to drug 
use percentages (p. 108). He presents statistics that prove that Afri-
can Americans are no more likely to use drugs than whites ·but are 
far more likely to be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for drug 
offenses.31 He maintains that the architects made no secret of their 
intention to carry out the War on Drugs in poor, predominantly 
minority neighborhoods where drug use and trafficking is open and 
easy to detect (pp. 105-06). He suggests that police made more 
drug arrests in these communities because they are easier to pene-
William J. Bennett was appointed as the agency's first director. Bennett proposed a strategy 
that included massive increases in the penalties and punishment levied on drug offenders, 
including first-time drug users. See THE WHITE HousE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRAT-
EGY (1989); Diane M. Canova, The National Drug Control Strategy: A Synopsis, in HAND-
BOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 339-48 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1990). 
30. Tonry reports that drug offenders comprised 25 percent of the federal prison popula-
tion in 1980 and 58 percent in 1992. See pp. 81-82. The annual cost of maintaining one 
prisoner runs between $20,000 and $30,000 while the cost of building a new prison ranges 
from $50,000 to $200,000 per prisoner. See p. 82. 
31. The most recent household surveys of the National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) 
revealed that in 1992 and 1993, African Americans composed only 13% of monthly drug 
users. See MAUER & HULING, supra note 20, at 12. However, African Americans composed 
35% of drug possession arrests, 55% of drug possession convictions, and 74% of drug posses-
sion imprisonments. See id. 
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trate, but bemoans the dearth of available literature in support of 
this analysis.32 Tonry's examination of juvenile drug arrests by race 
provides further evidence that the War was implemented in a 
grossly discriminatory manner. Citing the criminologist Alfred 
Blumstein, Tonry notes that white juvenile drug arrests rose from 
the late 1960s to the early 1980s but then dropped after the early 
1980s just as black juvenile drug arrests began to increase sharply 
(p. 111). 
Tonry also agrees with Blumstein's assertion that drug law en-
forcement declined in the 1970s when drug use was seen as a 
middle-class white phenomenon but then increased again in the late 
1980s when it was seen as a low-income minority phenomenon (p. 
112). Using graphs and data on drug use over the near-twenty-year 
period from 1975 to 1991, Tonry illustrates that drug use was actu-
ally in steep decline at the time the Drug War began in the late 
1980s (p. 91). He then cites David Musto, a leading historian of 
American drug policies, for the propositions that American toler-
ance of drug and alcohol use follows a cyclical pattern, and that 
harsh, draconian drug policies usually appear during the decline 
phase of drug use, when societal tolerance is low (p. 92). He quotes 
Musto's thesis, which states that during this decline phase, drug use 
becomes associated with "the lower ranks of society, and often with 
racial and ethnic groups that are feared or despised by the middle 
class."33 Tonry contends that this precise phenomenon occurred 
with regard to crack cocaine during the 1980s. 
As mentioned previously, Tonry's harshest indictment of the 
War on Drugs is his contention that it was "a calculated effort fore-
ordained to increase" the percentages of blacks in prison (p. 82). 
His analysis of how and why the architects of the War targeted 
black Americans is chilling. Not only did the architects of the War 
on Drugs specifically target black Americans, but they did so for 
the benefit of primarily white, nondisadvantaged Americans (p. 95). 
Citing Emile Durkheim's theory of how laws influence behavior, 
Tonry maintains that the criminal laws define the outer limits of 
acceptable behavior and have dramaturgical properties that help 
shape the values and beliefs of the larger society (p. 95). In other 
words, the public apprehension and punishment of wrongdoers help 
socialize others. According to Tonry, "[m]ost people abstain from 
crime and drug use not because of the immediate threat of penalties 
but because they are socialized to believe the behaviors are wrong; 
32. For one report providing authority for Tonry's claim, see UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENC-
ING PouCY 70 (1995) (noting that police have more difficulty targeting dealers who sell to 
affluent users in upper-class neighborhoods). 
33. P. 94 (quoting DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTICS 
CONTROL (1973)). 
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they are not the kind of people who are tempted (or tempted 
enough) to do such things" (p. 95). Thus, Tonry suggests that the 
Reagan officials purposefully began the War on Drugs at a time 
when drug use was declining in order to take advantage of the low 
social tolerance of drug use and to reinforce their moral message (p. 
96). He concludes that this effort to reinforce the existing norms of 
white people destroyed the lives of many young black and Hispanic 
men (p. 97). Tonry maintains that the architects of the War knew 
that drug use was declining among whites but not among blacks and 
Hispanics and that blacks and Hispanics would be the primary casu-
alties of the War (p. 104). 
Tonry certainly makes interesting arguments, but he provides no 
evidence to support his strong, almost criminal, accusations against 
the anonymous architects of the War on Drugs. Furthermore, his 
conclusions tend to conflict. For example, after he refers to the War 
on Drugs as a "calculated effort foreordained" to increase the black 
prison population (p. 82), he later concludes that the most charita-
ble interpretation of the disproportionate increase in the African-
American prison population is that it was "a foreseen but not an 
intended consequence" (p. 115), and the least charitable interpreta-
tion is that it was "the product of malign neglect of the war's effects 
on black Americans" (p. 115). Although the term "malign neglect" 
suggests behavior that is unintentional yet evil because of its harm-
ful consequences, it does not describe the purposeful, intentional 
behavior he alleges earlier. 
Tonry's analysis also fails to address two of the most significant 
phenomena that impacted the War on Drugs: discriminatory 
prosecutorial practices and sentencing laws. Prosecutors have un-
bridled discretion in deciding whether to charge a suspect, what 
charge or charges to bring,34 and whether to offer a plea bargain.35 
Both charging and plea bargaining decisions have a tremendous ef-
fect on the outcome of a case. For example, the decision to charge 
a defendant with possession of cocaine rather than possession with 
intent to distribute cocaine could mean the difference between a 
34. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding that prosecutors 
should be granted broad discretion since it is they, and not the courts, who must evaluate the 
strength of the case, the allocation of resources, and enforcement priorities); United States v. 
Palmer, 3 F.3d 300, 305 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1120 (1994) ("[S)eparation of 
powers concerns prohibit us from reviewing a prosecutor's charging decisions absent a prima 
facie showing that it rested on an impermissible basis .•.. ");United States v. Chagra, 669 
F.2d 241, 247 (5th Cir.) (noting that the Constitution grants the authority for faithful execu-
tion of laws to the executive branch), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846 (1982); see also United States 
v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1444 (7th Cir. 1986) (asserting that the prosecutorial decision to 
delay prosecution is a priority decision that should not be subject to judicial review). 
35. See United States v. Moody, 778 F.2d 1380, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 791 
F.2d 707 (9th Cir. 1986) ("There is no constitutional right to a plea bargain, and the decision 
••• to offer a plea bargain is a matter of prosecutorial discretion."). 
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probationary sentence and a lengthy prison term.36 By the same 
token, a prosecutor may offer a plea bargain that will help a def end-
ant to avoid imprisonment.37, Tonry makes no mention of these de-
cisions or the extent to which race may play a role in them. 
Most drug offenses may be prosecuted in either state or federal 
court.38 Federal prosecutors have played a significant role in the 
War on Drugs by exercising their discretion to prosecute drug cases 
in federal court.39 Federal law enforcement agents - under con-
trol of a United States Attorney's office - often work with state 
and local police,4o but they make the final decisions themselves.41 
The decision to prosecute in federal court, like the charging and 
plea bargaining decisions, can mean the difference between proba-
tion and a lengthy prison term. The penalties for drug possession, 
possession with intent to distribute drugs, and distribution of drugs 
tend to be far harsher in federal court than in state courts.42 
Although recent cases have alleged discrimination in the exercise of 
the prosecutorial discretion to bring cases in federal court, the stan-
dards for merely getting discovery and an evidentiary hearing are 
36. In the federal system, a crack possession charge of four to five grams can result in a 
sentence of one to two years. See 21 U.S.C.A. § 844 (West Supp. 1996). In contrast, a distri-
bution charge based on a similar amount of crack can result in a sentence ranging from 
eleven years to life in prison, depending on the defendant's criminal history. See UNITED 
STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES [hereinafter USSG] § 5 (1995). In the District of Colum-
bia Superior Court, a crack possession charge can result in a sentence of 180 days, a $1000 
fine, or both. D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(d) (1981). However, a conviction for possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine can result in a sentence of up to thirty years, a $500,000 fine, 
or both. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(a)(2)(A) (1981). 
37. See supra note 35. 
38. See 21 U.S.C. § 801 (1988) (Controlled Substance Act of 1970 § 101, which estab-
lished broad federal jurisdiction over drug crimes); see also Sandra Guerra, The Myth of Dual 
Sovereignty: Multijurisdictional Drug Law Enforcement and Double Jeopardy, 73 N.C. L. 
REv. 1159, 1165-66 (1995) (examining federal and state jurisdiction in drug cases). 
39. The implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has greatly increased the 
power of federal prosecutors. Because the guidelines mandate a particular sentence when 
certain objective factors apply in a particular case, judges exercise little or no discretion in 
imposing sentences in federal court. Thus, the charging and plea bargaining decisions of 
prosecutors often predetermine the outcome of a case. See generally William J. Powell & 
Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 97 W. 
VA. L. REV. 373 (1995); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 
CAL L. REV. 1471 (1993); Elizabeth A. Parsons, Note, Shifting the Balance of Power: 
Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 29 VAL U. L. REv. 417 
(1994); Steve Y. Koh, Note, Reestablishing the Federal Judge's Role in Sentencing, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1109 (1992). 
40. See Guerra, supra note 38, at 1182. 
41. See id. at 1183. 
42. See, e.g., CAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CoDE §§ 11351-11351.5 (West 1991) (Distribu-
tion of cocaine results in two- to five-year sentence.); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 94c, § 32 (Law. 
Co-op. 1995) (Distribution of cocaine results in up to a ten-year sentence.); NEv. REV. STAT. 
§ 453.337 (1995) (Distribution of cocaine results in one- to fifteen-year sentence.). The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines, by contrast, mandate a sentence of 235 months to life in prison 
for possession with intent to distribute five grams of crack cocaine. USSG Ch. 5, Pt. A 
(1996). 
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set quite high.43 Furthermore, criminal defendants bringing these 
challenges must prove intentional discrimination by the individual 
prosecutor, an extremely difficult burden to meet.44 
The disparity between the federal sentencing laws for powder 
versus crack cocaine also has a tremendously discriminatory effect 
on African Americans. The penalties for. possession and distribu-
tion of five grams of crack cocaine are the same as the penalties for 
possession and distribution of 500 grams of powder cocaine.45 The 
majority of individuals convicted of all crack cocaine offenses are 
African American.46 By contrast, the majority of those convicted 
of powder cocaine possession and a significant percentage of those 
prosecuted for powder cocaine trafficking are white.47 The effect of 
this disparity on the incarceration rate of African Americans in fed-
eral prisons has been phenomenal;4s yet, Tonry does not mention 
this in his analysis of the War on Drugs. He does make passing 
reference to it in his chapter on solutions (pp. 188-89) but incor-
rectly states that "crack tends to be used and sold by blacks and 
powder by whites" (p. 188). The 1991 National Household Survey 
on Drug Abuse conducted by the National Institute on Drug Abuse 
revealed that of those reporting crack use at least once in that year, 
43. Nine black defendants charged with crack cocaine trafficking and fireanns offenses in 
federal court in Los Angeles filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for selective prosecu-
tion based on race. They claimed that the U.S. Attorney prosecuted virtually all African 
Americans charged with crack offenses in federal court and all white crack defendants in 
state court. Federal courts penalize crack trafficking much more harshly than state courts. 
See supra note 42. The defendants filed a discovery motion to obtain information in support 
of their selective prosecution claim. The information requested included the criteria for de-
ciding whether to bring charges in federal court and the number and racial identity of all 
defendants charged with crack offenses in both federal and state court. The District Court 
granted the motion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court 
after a rehearing en bane, holding that a "colorable basis" for selective prosecution entitles a 
defendant to discovery. See United States v. Armstrong, 48 F.3d 1508 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. 
granted, 116 S. Ct 377 (U.S. Oct. 30, 1995) (No. 95-157). The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide the narrow issue of the applicable standard for discovery in selective prosecu-
tion claims based on race. On May 13, ~996, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit 
decision, holding that, in order to establish entitlement to discovery in selective prosecution 
cases based on race, a defendant must produce credible evidence that similarly situated de-
fendants of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not. The Court held that de-
fendants in Armstrong did not meet this threshold. United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. a. 
1480 (1996). For a more thorough discussion of selective prosecution claims, see infra text 
accompanying notes 73-84. 
44. See infra text accompanying notes 79-84. 
45. See USSG § 2Dl.1 (c)(8) (1996). 
46. In 1993, 88.3% of federal prisoners convicted of crack trafficking were black and 
84.5% of federal prisoners convicted of crack possession were black. See UNITED STATES 
SENTENCING COMM., supra note 32, at 156. 
47. In 1993, 32% of federal prisoners convicted of powder cocaine trafficking were white 
and 58% of federal prisoners convicted of powder cocaine possession were white. Id. 
48. A Bureau of Justice Statistics study conducted by Douglas McDonald and Kenneth 
Carlson suggested that between 1986 and 1990 both the rate and length of imprisonment for 
federal offenders increased for blacks as compared to whites, primarily because of the dispa-
rate federal cocaine laws. Id. at 162. 
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fifty-two percent were white, thirty-eight percent were black, and 
ten percent were Hispanic.49 
III. RACIAL DISPROPORTION IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Tonry falters most when he attempts to support his conclusion 
that racial bias in the criminal justice system plays a minor role in 
the disproportionate incarceration of African Americans. Tonry as-
serts that, although African Americans are present in dispropor-
tionate numbers at every stage of the criminal process, their 
numbers have remained stable at the arrest stage since the 1980s. 
He maintains that most of the racial disparity in sentencing results 
from the offending and criminal records of African Americans 
. rather than from racial bias or discrimination in the criminal justice 
system (p. 49). Finally, he argues that drug law enforcement stands 
alone as the one notable exception to this rule.so 
Tonry concedes that some racial bias exists in the criminal jus-
tice system, but concludes that "the apparent influence of the of-
fender's race on official decisions concerning individual defendants 
is slight" (p. 50). Tonry bases this conclusion on his review of the 
social science literature and statistical studies that compare black 
and white arrest rates and victim surveys with imprisonment rates.st 
Tonry's conclusions are undermined by several major flaws in 
his analysis. First, he fails even to acknowledge the literature that 
suggests the existence of racial bias at various stages of the criminal 
process, including the arrest, prosecution, trial, and sentencing 
phases.s2 Second, he appears to define racial bias in terms of open, 
intentional biased acts without recognizing the possibility or signifi-
cance of unconscious racisms3 on the part of criminal justice offi-
cials. Third, he fails to see the racial bias in his own analyses. 
49. See id. at 33-39. 
50. "Blacks are arrested and confined in numbers grossly out of line with their use or sale 
of drugs." P. 49. Even though Tonry admits here that there is discrimination in the process-
ing of drug offenses, he places the primary responsibility for that discrimination with the 
architects of the War on Drugs, not on police and other criminal justice officials. See infra 
section III.A. 
51. See infra section III.B. 
52. See supra notes 31 & 46-50 and infra text accompanying notes 86-88. 
53. Professor Charles Lawrence defines unconscious racism as the ideas, attitudes, and 
beliefs developed in American historical and cultural heritage that cause Americans uncon-
sciously to attach significance to an individual's race and that induce negative feelings and 
opinions about nonwhites. He argues that although America's historical experience has 
made racism an integral part of our culture, because racism is rejected as immoral, most 
people exclude it from their conscious minds. See Lawrence, supra note 27, at 322-23; see 
also Johnson, supra note 27 (discussing unconscious racism in criminal law and procedure). 
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A. The Existence of Racial Bias in the Criminal Justice System 
Tonry does acknowledge the existence of racism and discrimina-
tion in American society. In fact, he identifies such discrimination 
and racism as the primary reason for the socio-economic disadvan-
tages that lead to black criminality (pp. 128-34). Tonry also con-
cedes that racism exists in the criminal process,s4 but he trivializes 
the discriminatory impact of the policies and discretionary practices 
of criminal justice officials. There is, in fact, ample evidence that 
racism plays a role at every stage of the criminal process.ss This 
section will address the two stages - arrest and prosecution -
during which some of the most determinative decisions in the crimi-
nal process are made. The effect of race and racism on these stages 
of the process is significant, because many of these determinative 
decisions are totally within the discretion of police and 
prosecutors. s6 
1. Law Enforcement 
With the exception of drug-law enforcement,s7 Tonry concludes 
that biased police practices are "not a serious problem" (p. 71). He 
bases this conclusion on his belief that "few or no reliable, system-
atic data are available that demonstrate systematic discrimination" 
(p. 71). He also draws support from a number of other authors.ss 
For example, he cites William Wilbanks for the proposition that 
"the evidence supporting claims of systematic discrimination 
against blacks by the police 'is sparse, inconsistent, and contradic-
tory to the discrimination thesis.' "S9 
54. See p. 49. When Tonry refers ·to bias in the criminal justice system, he appears to refer 
to the actions of official criminal justice officials such as police, prosecutors, judges, and other 
court officials rather than to the actions of citizens who become involved in the criminal 
justice system, such as grand jurors, petit jurors, victims, and. witnesses. See pp. 49-50. 
55. See supra note 4. 
56. Although judges also exercise discretion at every stage of the process, their discretion 
at the sentencing phase has been greatly diminished by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
and by the increased adoption of mandatory minimum sentencing laws on both the federal 
and state levels. For a discussion of the effect of the Sentencing Guidelines on judicial discre-
tion, see Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1938 (1988); Hon. Bruce M. Selya & John C. Massaro, 
The Illustrative Role of Substantial Assistance Departures in Combatting Ultra-Uniformity, 35 
B.C. L. REv. 799 (1994); Koh, supra note 39; Philip Oliss, Comment, Mandatory Minimum 
Sentencing: Discretion, the Safety Valve, and the Sentencing Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 
1851 (1995); Parsons, supra note 39. 
57. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33. 
58. See p. 71 (citing WILUAM WILBANKS, THE MYTH OF A RACIST CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM (1987); MANN, supra note 4; RACE AND CRIMINAL JusncE (Michael J. Lynch & E. 
Britt Patterson eds., 1991); James J. Fyfe, Race and Extreme Police-Citizen Violence, in RACE, 
CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JuSTicE (R.L. McNeely & Carl E. Pope eds., 1981)). 
59. See p. 71 (quoting WILBANKS, supra note 58, at 139.) 
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Tonry actually acknowledges that police treat African Ameri-
cans differently, but does not seem to appreciate the significance of 
this discriminatory treatment. He argues that "the fact that police 
and others too often for no reason other than skin color or style of 
dress are suspicious of blacks does not, according to the best avail-
able evidence, mean that blacks as defendants and convicted of-
fenders are treated fundamentally differently than whites" (p. 51). 
It is not clear what Tonry means by this statement. He may be sug-
gesting that the fact that police officers discriminate against blacks 
does not necessarily mean that blacks will suffer discrimination at 
later stages of the criminal process. He may also be suggesting that 
the fact that police officers and others are suspicious of blacks be-
cause of their skin color or dress is not particularly harmful. Both 
interpretations fail to appreciate how the nature of the initial police 
contact may effect the ultimate outcome of a criminal case. 
On the other hand, Tonry does not acknowledge the harm in-
herent in the fact that police officers disproportionately stop and 
detain African American men when they have neither probable 
cause for an arrest nor the articulable suspicion required for a 
"Terry stop."6o That police officers are generally more suspicious of 
blacks, and therefore stop and detain them more frequently than 
whites, is inherently discriminatory.61 Such stops and detentions 
are by their very nature invasive and intrusive. 62 Also, the fact that 
police stop and detain blacks more frequently than whites63 natu-
rally results in a disproportionate number of black arrests. 64 A po-
lice stop without probable cause or an articulable suspicion coupled 
with abusive language or behavior by the police may escalate into a 
60. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Terry gives police officers tremendous discretion to 
stop and detain individuals with little or no guidance as to what constitutes "articulable suspi-
cion." 392 U.S. at 21. Police officers have acknowledged the use of race as a factor in decid-
ing to stop and detain a suspect and courts have approved the use of race in certain 
circumstances. See cases cited supra note 5. 
61. See Donald J. Black & Albert Reiss, Jr., Police Control of Juveniles, 35 AM. Soc. REV. 
63, 63 (1970); Daniel Georges-Abeyie, Definitional Issues: Race, Ethnicity, and Official 
Crime/Victimization Statistics, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND BLACKS (1984); see 
also Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J. 
593, 607-09 (1996) (arguing that young, black men are labeled as deviants before they have 
any contact with the criminal justice system and that police interactions with black men tend 
to reinforce existing stereotypes). 
62. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25. 
63. See generally Johnson, supra note 5. 
64. See DAVID H. BAYLEY & HAROLD MENDELSOHN, MINORITIES AND THE POLICE: 
CONFRONTATION IN AMERICA 195 (1969); Lois B. Defleur, Biasing Influences on Drug Arrest 
Records: Implications for Deviance Research, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 88, 91-92 (1975); Richard C. 
Hollinger, Race, Occupational Status, and Pro-Active Police Arrest for Drinking and Driving, 
12 J. CRIM. JuST. 173, 181-82 (1984); Weldon T. Johnson et al., Arrest Probabilities for Mari-
juana Users as Indicators of Selective Law Enforcement, 83 AM. J. Soc. 681, 691 (1977); 
Lawrence W. Sherman, Causes of Police Behavior: The Current State of Quantitative Re-
search, 17 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 69, 79 (1980). 
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confrontation that results in arrest whether or not the stop produces 
other evidence of criminal activity.65 The fact that police officers do 
not make illegal stops of whites with the same frequency necessarily 
means that whites engaging in criminal activity may, more easily 
evade arrest66 and that confrontations between whites and police 
officers that may escalate into arrests will not occur as often.67 
To support his argument that arrests are not racially biased 
Tonry quotes Coramae Richey Mann's observation that "the few 
available studies of this issue offer support to both sides of the 
question."68 However, Tonry takes Mann's statement out of its 
context - a comprehensive discussion of the relevant sociological 
literature that concludes that police officers do engage in discrimi-
natory practices and policies.69 As such, he engages in the same 
selective and deceptive use of data of which he accuses former At-
torney General Barr. Ironically, Mann notes that "[t]ragically, 
many white social scientists ... not only appear blind to the perva-
sive problem of white police maltreatment of peoples of color, but 
also disregard documentation proffered by the abused as anecdotal 
and belittle the opinions of experts in the field, particularly racial 
minorities with experience and expertise."70 
2. Prosecution 
Tonry also fails to acknowledge that racial bias plays a role dur-
ing the prosecution stage of the criminal process. Like police of-
ficers, prosecutors exercise a tremendous amount of discretion in 
most of their official decisions, particularly in charging and plea 
bargaining.71 Courts have been reluctant to interfere with the exer-
cise of this discretion. They point to the prosecutors' expertise and 
experience in evaluating which cases warrant prosecution as well as 
to the separation of powers doctrine.72 
There is always potential for abuse whenever such unregulated 
discretion exists. !he Supreme Court has addressed claims of dis-
65. See supra note 7. 
66. Such random stops might produce evidence of a variety of crimes such as drug of-
fenses, weapons offenses, auto theft, larceny, burglary, and driving while intoxicated. See 
supra text accompanying notes 1-10 for a discussion of the discretionary nature of the arrest 
power and its discriminatory effect on African Americans. 
67. Even when police officers stop white suspects, they may avoid the language and be-
havior that often lead to such confrontations. 
68. P. 71 (quoting MANN, supra note 4, at 139). 
69. See generally MANN, supra note 4, at 133-55. 
70. Id. at 133-34. 
71. See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text; see also James Vorenberg, Decent Re-
straint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981) (discussing the discretion of 
prosecutors in charging and other decisions); Developments in the Law, supra note 4. 
72. See infra notes 81-82. 
1678 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:1660 
criminatory prosecutorial decisions to seek the death penalty and to 
use peremptory strikes during jury selection. In McCleskey v. 
Kemp, 73 for example, an African American sentenced to death in 
Georgia claimed that the prosecutor sought and obtained the death 
penalty more frequently in cases involving white victims and black 
defendants than in other cases.74 The Supreme Court rejected Mc-
Cleskey's argument that the administration of the Georgia capital 
punishment system violated the Equal Protection Clause.75 On the 
other hand, in Batson v. Kentucky, 76 the Supreme Court held that a 
prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to eliminate African Ameri-
cans from juries did violate the Equal Protection Clause.77 
The fact that so few cases alleging discriminatory prosecution 
practices succeed may be more a function of the legal limitations on 
such challenges than the merits of the claims. For example, while 
criminal defendants may theoretically pursue selective prosecution 
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-83, courts have discouraged these 
claims by making it very difficult to establish standing.78 Further-
more, a plaintiff who manages to establish standing must then 
demonstrate discriminatory intent - rather than mere disparate 
impact - to successfully challenge the constitutionality of facially 
neutral practices and policies.79 
Defendants more commonly challenge racially selective prose-
cution by moving for the dismissal of their indictments. Here again, 
however, the defendant must prove intentional discrimination by an 
individual prosecutor. In addition, some courts have required de-
fendants to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory effect and 
73. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
74. McCleskey proffered a study by David Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski, and George 
Woodworth, commonly known as the Baldus study, which presents statistical evidence that 
prosecutors seek and obtain the death penalty more frequently in cases involving white vic-
tims. The Baldus study examined 400 factors that may have influenced the sentences of 2400 
people convicted of homicide in Georgia. It concluded that those whose victims were white 
were 4.3 times more likely to receive the death penalty than those whose victims were black. 
See DAVID c. BAIDUS ET AL., EOUAL JUSTICE AND TIIE DEATII PENALTY: A LEOAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS (1990). 
75. See McC/eskey, 481 U.S. at 291-99. 
76. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
77. The Batson Court laid out a three-part test to establish purposeful discrimination in 
the selection of a petit jury. The defendant must show: (1) that he is a member of a "cogni-
zable racial group"; (2) that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to exclude mem-
bers of defendant's race; and (3) that the facts raise an inference that the prosecutor used 
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors based on their race. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98. 
78. To establish standing, (1) the plaintiff must demonstrate a direct injury-in-fact, see 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975); (2) the injury must be traceable to the unlawful 
conduct of the prosecutor, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261 (1977); and (3) the injury must be redressable by the relief that the 
plaintiff has requested, see Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). 
79. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
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purpose before even obtaining an evidentiary hearing on their 
claim..80 
Tonry would probably agree that the Supreme Court's equal 
protection analysis should not be the measure of whether particular 
acts, practices, or policies discriminate against African Americans 
(p. 35). The requirement that a defendant show intentional dis-
crimination on the part of an individual prosecutor provides no re-
lief for the equally harmful but unintentional discrimination. The 
fact that a prosecutor can identify a race-neutral justification for his 
actions does not establish the absence of racist or discriminatory 
behavior.s1 Indeed, courts permit prosecutors to consider such fac-
tors such as the likelihood of conviction, the strength of the evi-
dence, the interest of the victim in prosecution, and the seriousness 
of the offense in deciding how to resolve a case.82 However, prose-
cutors may subconsciously deem a case involving a white victim and 
a black defendant as more serious than other cases.83 If a prosecu-
tor views a case as more serious, she will then devote more re-
sources and time toward investigating it and preparing it for trial. 
Consequently, the "strength of the evidence" and the "likelihood of 
conviction" will improve. Thus, seemingly race-neutral factors can 
have a discriminatory impact when the prosecutor engages in sub-
conscious discrimination. 84 
Although difficult standing requirements and equal protection 
standards have limited the number of successful legal challenges to 
discriminatory prosecutorial practices, empirical studies consist-
ently demonstrate that race does indeed affect prosecutorial deci-
sions. These studies were conducted in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
and most of them used multiple regression analysis to control for 
80. See supra note 43. 
81. In his concurrence in Batson, Justice Marshall advocated the elimination of peremp-
tory strikes because of his belief that prosecutors could always offer a race-neutral justifica-
tion for an otherwise discriminatory decision. Justice Marshall argued: 
[A]ny prosecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking a juror, and trial 
courts are ill equipped to second-guess those reasons .••. A prosecutor's own conscious 
or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the conclusion that a prospective black 
juror is "sullen," or "distant,'' a characterization that would not have come to his mind if 
a white juror had acted identically. A judge's own conscious or unconscious racism may 
lead him to accept such an explanation as well supported. As Justice Rehnquist con-
cedes, prosecutors peremptories are based on their "seat-of-the-pants instincts" as to 
how particular jurors will vote .... Yet "seat-of-the-pants instincts" may often be just 
another term for racial prejudice. 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring). 
82. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 396 (1987) (holding that prosecutors 
should be granted broad discretion since it is they, not the courts, who must evaluate the 
strength of the case, including the weight of the evidence, the victims' interest in prosecution, 
and enforcement priorities). 
83. See BALDUS ET AL., supra note 74. 
84. See Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1520-27 (discussing race and the prose-
cutor's charging decision). 
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nonracial factors such as the defendant's prior record, the availabil-
ity of witnesses, the use of weapons, the type of offense, and the 
victim's prosecution preference.85 The studies showed that cases in-
volving black defendants and white victims were prosecuted more 
vigorously than cases involving white defendants and black vic-
tims.86 That is, prosecutors sought more serious charges, declined 
to offer plea bargains, and declined to dismiss at the initial screen-
ing more frequently in these cases.87 Likewise, they were more 
likely to dismiss or downgrade charges against white defendants.88 
One cannot understate the impact of these discretionary deci-
sions by prosecutors on the outcome of a criminal case. The deci-
sion to dismiss a case or to offer a plea bargain lies totally within 
the prosecutor's discretion. Unless the defendant can convince a 
jury of his innocence, these prosecutorial decisions often determine 
the outcome of a case. The determinative nature of prosecutorial 
decisions is further amplified by the existence of federal sentencing 
guidelines and mandatory minimum sentencing laws that virtually 
remove the discretionary power of judges at the sentencing stage of 
the process. 
Tonry should hold prosecutors and police responsible for the 
discriminatory impact of their decisions in the same way that he 
holds the Reagan and Bush administrations responsible for the dis-
criminatory impact of their crime policies. Tonry seems to base his 
conclusions about the arrest process on his view that "few or no 
reliable systematic data are available that demonstrate systematic 
discrimination" (p. 71). But where are the data, or even the anec-
dotal evidence, to support his statement that the War on Drugs was 
a "calculated effort" foreordained to increase the percentages of 
blacks in prison (p. 82)? Perhaps this conclusion reasonably follows 
from his belief that the proponents of these policies had to know 
the likely outcome of their decisions. Tonry, however, refuses to 
draw any inferences at all about the arrest process. In that context, 
85. For an explanation of multiple regression analysis, see Franklin M. Fisher, Multiple 
Regression in Legal Proceedings, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 702 (1980). 
86. See WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE 340·44 (1980); William J. Bowers 
& Glenn L. Pierce, Arbitrariness and Discrimination Under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 
CRIME & DEUNQ. 563, 612-14 (1980); Gary D. LaFree, The Effect of Sexual Stratification by 
Race on Official Reactions to Rape, 45 AM. Soc. REv. 842, 852-53 (1980); Martha A. Myers & 
John Hagan, Private and Public Trouble: Prosecutors and the Allocation of Court Resources, 
26 Soc. PROBS. 439 (1979); Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Prosecutorial 
Discretion in Homicide Cases, 19 LAw & SoCY. REV. 587, 615-19 (1985); Cassia Spohn et al., 
The Impact of the Ethnicity and Gender of Defendants on the Decision To Reject or Dismiss 
Felony Charges, 25 CRIMINOLOGY 175 (1987). 
87. For an overview of these studies, see Developments in the Law, supra note 4, at 1525-
32. 
88. See id. 
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he demands "reliable, systematic data" - and then he ignores the 
data already available. 
B. The Evidence of Racial Bias in Tonry's Own Statistical 
Analysis 
Tonry underestimates the possible effect of discretionary police 
action on arrest records. Police officers are not required to make 
an arrest when a crime is reported or even when they witness a 
crime in progress. However, if a police officer tends to break up 
bar fights among whites by sending them home and resolves similar 
fights among blacks by arresting them, the arrest statistics for as-
sault would not accurately reflect criminality among blacks and 
whites. In other words, the wide discretion of police officers may 
result in inflated black arrest rates for certain offenses. Because 
police decisions not to stop and not to arrest are not documented, it 
is impossible to know how much or how little arrest rates reflect 
actual criminality. 
There is another problem with using arrest rates to measure 
criminality. Since only approximately one-third of all individuals 
arrested for serious offenses are ever formally charged with these 
crimes,s9 a comparison of arrest rates with imprisonments rates will 
not accurately reflect the extent of racial bias in the criminal pro-
cess. A more accurate measure of racial bias could be achieved by 
examining the disposition of criminal offenses at each stage of the 
process.90 
For example, if a police officer arrests two suspects, one white 
and one black, for assault with a dangerous weapon, the prosecutor 
could decide to charge formally the white suspect with misde-
meanor assault and the black suspect with felony assault. That de-
cision alone may very well determine whether or not each 
defendant ultimately goes to prison since it is reasonable to surmise 
that defendants are more likely to be imprisoned for more serious 
offenses. Tonry himself states that "the seriousness of the current 
offense is, by a wide margin, the best predictor of which offenders 
are sent to prison and for how long" (p. 67). Even if the judge may 
exercise discretion at the sentencing phase, conscious or uncon-
scious racial bias may affect her decision. Thus, records indicating 
the disposition of criminal offenses by race at the arrest, prosecu-
tion, and sentencing stages would more accurately reflect the extent 
of racial bias in the entire criminal process than arrest records 
alone. 
89. See Gwynne Peirson, Institutional Racism and Crime Clearance, in BLACK PERSPEC-
TIVES ON CRIME AND TiiE CruMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 107, 110 (Robert L. Woodson ed., 
1977). 
90. See id. 
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Despite the problems inherent in relying on arrest statistics, 
Tonry relies on Alfred Blumstein's 1982 study of racial arrest and 
imprisonment patterns to support his conclusion that racial bias 
plays only a minor role in the criminal justice system.91 Blumstein's 
analysis assumes "that in a nonbiased system, racial proportions in 
arrests would be mirrored in racial proportions imprisoned" (p. 66). 
Thus, Blumstein compares black arrest rates in eleven categories of 
offenses with the corresponding black imprisonment rates for these 
offenses (p. 65). 
Tonry's interpretation of Blumstein seems disingenuous at best. 
Of the eleven categories of offenses for which Blumstein compares 
black arrest and imprisonment rates, ten categories indicate an un-
explained disproportionately high rate of black imprisonment (p. 
66). In other words, the percentage of blacks imprisoned for each 
of these offenses is greater than the percentage of whites arrested 
for each. For some offenses such as homicide and aggravated as-
sault, the percentage of unexplained disproportionality is relatively 
low - 2.8% and 5.2% respectively (p. 66). However, for seven 
other offenses, the percentage is much higher - 26.3 for rape, 27.3 
for other violent crimes, 29.5 for public order offenses, 33.3 for bur-
glary, and 45.6 for larceny and auto theft offenses (p. 66). The high-
est percentage - 48.9 - exists in drug cases (p. 66), the one 
category in which Tonry concedes the presence of racial bias. Tonry 
averages the percentages and finds a twenty percent overall rate of 
unexplained disproportionality in black imprisonment (p. 67). 
Tonry's explanation of the disproportionality is weak and incon-
clusive. He states that the disproportion "might be illegitimate, like 
conscious racial bias or unconscious reliance on stereotypes detri-
mental to blacks. Some might result from idiosyncracies of individ-
ual judges" (p. 67). Tonry then notes, without committing either 
way, that some of the disproportionate imprisonment may reflect 
legitimate considerations like "prior criminal records or the effects 
of penalties on the offender's family. "92 Throughout this section, he 
speaks of racial bias as if it were a hypothetical phenomenon rather 
than a reality. For example, at one point, he states, "If, for exam-
ple, black offenders with white victims were punished more harshly 
than white offenders with white victims, and black offenders with 
black victims less harshly, the former would reflect bias against 
black offenders and the latter bias against black victims, and aggre-
gate imprisonment data might reveal neither pattern. "93 
91. See Alfred Blumstein, Racial Disproportionality of U.S. Prison Populations Revisited, 
64 u. Cow. L. REV. 743 (1993). 
92. P. 67. Here again, Tonry fails to acknowledge that racial bias may affect the prior 
criminal records. 
93. P. 68. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87 and note 74 for a discussion of studies 
that reveal harsher treatment of black defendants in cases involving white victims. 
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Tonry also examines Patrick Langan's analysis of the 1985 Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics. Langan compared victimization survey 
data with imprisonment rates in an attempt to account for racial 
bias in arrest patterns. Tonry asserts that Langan's statistics pro-
vide even more proof of his thesis. Here again, however, Tonry 
overlooks significant percentages of unexplained disproportionality 
in imprisonment rates. 
Langan compares victims' identification of black assailants with 
black imprisonment rates for five offenses - robbery, aggravated 
assault, simple assault, burglary, and larceny - in the years 1973, 
1979, and 1982. Although the percentages of unexplained dispro-
portionality are insignificant for robbery and larceny, they are quite 
significant for the other three offenses, particularly for aggravated 
and simple assault. In 1973, twenty-nine percent of aggravated as-
sault victims reported that their assailants were black but fifty-two 
percent of prison admissions for this crime were black (p. 76). In 
1979, these percentages were twenty-eight and forty-seven, respec-
tively (p. 76). In 1982, the gap widened to twenty-two and fifty, 
respectively (p. 76). The simple assault category yielded compara-
ble statistics (p. 76). Tonry does not explain these significant dis-
proportions, stating only that they "may be misleading because of 
small numbers and random variation" (p. 77). As with the Blum-
stein analysis, he calculates the "average" disproportion for all of-
fenses and reports that "only" twenty percent of the disproportion 
is unexplained (p. 77). Significantly, Blumstein replicates his study 
using 1991 data, and the unexplained disproportionality increased 
to twenty-four percent (pp. 77-78). 
Assuming one accepts the legitimacy of the studies by Blum-
stein and Langan,94 they hardly support Tonry's thesis that racial 
bias is a "relatively small" problem in the criminal justice system. 
In fact, Tonry's belief that racial arrest proportions would mirror 
racial imprisonment proportions "in a nonbiased system" would 
presumably lead him to the conclusion that the system is biased, 
since those proportions do not even remotely "mirror" one another. 
The twenty percent disproportionality suggests that the incarcera-
tion of a phenomenal number of African Americans may be based, 
at least in part, on racial bias in the criminal process.95 There were 
over 735,000 African Americans in prison in 1994.96 Twenty per-
cent of 735,000, or 147,000, is a staggering number. The more re-
94. Tonry states that official criminal justice records, such as those studied by Blumstein 
and Langan, "are at least as much an indicator of bureaucratic policies and officials' discre-
tionary decisions as of criminal events." P. 56. Nevertheless, he vouches for the credibility of 
their findings. 
95. Blumstein acknowledges that part, or all of, or even more than the twenty percent 
could reflect racial bias. Blumstein, supra note 91, at 749. 
96. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN (Feb. 1996). 
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cent estimation of twenty-four percent raises the number to over 
176,000. Even if only ten percent of the disproportionality resulted 
from racial bias, the number would still reach 73,000. These num-
bers cannot justify Tonry's characterization of racial bias as a "rela-
tively small" problem. There would be a significant problem if even 
1000 African Americans were imprisoned on this basis. That the 
widely accepted studies of Blumstein and Langan suggest a much 
greater number should be a cause for alarm. 
IV. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Tonry contends that the African-American crime rate reflects 
social and economic disadvantage (p. 125). He argues that a just 
system of punishment would take account of offenders' disadvan-
taged backgrounds and mitigate their punishments when feasible 
(p. 151). Tonry notes that "basic changes in the social and eco-
nomic conditions that shape the lives of disadvantaged black Amer-
icans and cause their disproportionate involvement in crime are 
beyond the power of the criminal justice system" (p. 39). However, 
he suggests that certain policy changes would help to protect Afri-
can Americans in the system. 
Tonry proposes a six-part harm reduction strategy. Under his 
first proposal, policy makers would consider the effect of potential 
policies on racial minorities (p. 182). Tonry criticizes the difficult 
intent standard in equal protection doctrine97 and argues that policy 
makers must hold themselves to something higher than constitu-
tional minimums. He urges them to enact laws and policies that 
avoid foreseeable racial disparities (p. 185). 
Tonry's second proposal advocates the establishment of a sen-
tencing regime with strong presumptive limits on punishment sever-
ity (p. 191). He suggests that upper limits on sentences for 
particular crimes will avoid unduly harsh outcomes that might 
otherwise emanate from the biases of particular judges (p. 191 ). 
The third and fourth parts of Tonry's strategy relate to his view 
that sentencing policies should direct judges to impose the "least 
restrictive appropriate alternative sentence" (p. 192). The third 
proposal advocates the repeal of all mandatory penalties so that 
judges can impose sentences based on the circumstances of each 
case (p. 195). The fourth proposal, closely related to the third, 
would allow for the mitigation of sentences as warranted by the of-
fender's characteristics or circumstances (p. 195). Implementation 
of these proposals would require the repeal of the Federal Sentenc-
97. See pp. 183·84. See supra text accompanying notes 79-84 for a discussion of the in-
tent standard. 
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ing Guidelines established by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.98 
Tonry explains that the Guidelines exacerbated racial disparities in 
sentencing (pp. 164-70) because its proponents failed to recognize 
that relatively few middle class and or white offenders are prose-
cuted in federal court (pp. 167-68). 
Tonry's fifth proposal suggests that we reinvest in treatment and 
other rehabilitative corrections programs (p. 201). He discusses 
studies that examine the effectiveness of treatment programs and 
concludes that certain types of treatment programs do reduce recid-
ivism (p. 202). He anticipates and meets the argument that we 
should not provide services to criminals that we do not provide to 
law-abiding citizens by pointing out that the government already 
pays $25,000 to $35,000 per year to house, feed, and otherwise sup-
port an adult prisoner while paying little or nothing to support his 
law-abiding brother (p. 204). Finally, he notes that money to invest 
in treatment programs would become available if the government 
stopped investing so much in failed crime-control policies like in-
terdiction and the imprisonment of nonviolent offenders (pp. 205-
06). 
Finally, Tonry urges elected officials to deal honestly with the 
public. He asks them to stop pandering to public fears, to have a 
frank and open discussion about the ineffectiveness of current 
crime policies, and to discontinue policies that do not work and that 
worsen the lot of blacks in America (p. 180). 
All of Tonry's proposals are viable, sound suggestions that could 
help to lessen the injustices in the current system. The improve-
ments that could result from his proposals would inure to the bene-
fit of all citizens, including African Americans. Some of the 
proposals, particularly his proposal that policymakers consider the 
potential racial impact of crime policies, might even help to reduce 
racial bias in the criminal process. 
Tonry's underestimation of racial bias in the criminal justice sys-
tem undoubtedly explains his failure to propose solutions for its 
elimination. He appears satisfied with his conclusion that racial 
bias is not "the principal reason" that blacks are disproportionately 
imprisoned (p. 79). In fact, he suggests that it would be "more so-
cially constructive" to change socioeconomic conditions and crimi-
nal justice policies than to "ferret out a willful and pervasive racial 
bias in a criminal justice system in which most officials and partici-
pants believe in racial equality" (p. 80). 
Should we not do both? The ferreting out of racial bias in the 
criminal justice system, whether willful or unintentional, occasional 
or routine, should be a priority in a civilized and just society. As 
98. See Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. 2, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1837, 2017-2026 (1984) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1994)). 
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Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in McCleskey, " 'Discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, odious in all aspects, is especially perni-
cious in the administration of justice.' ... Disparate enforcement of 
criminal sanctions 'destroys the appearance of justice and thereby 
casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process.' "99 
The important question is not whether racial bias is a "major" or 
"minor" cause of the disproportionate imprisonment of African 
Americans. The focus should be on how to discover and eliminate 
racial bias in the criminal justice system, wherever and whenever it 
exists. Law enforcement experts and criminologists should examine 
and propose solutions to the problem of racial bias in the discre-
tionary arrest decisions of police officers. We should consider mon-
itoring both police and prosecutor conduct.1°0 The monitoring of 
police conduct alone could have an effect on racially biased con-
duct. The discovery of discriminatory practices and policies will 
help us to formulate policies which protect all citizens without dis-
criminating against some. 
99. 481 U.S. 279 at 346 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 
555-56 (1979)). 
100. Eleven states and the District of Columbia have published reports on race and eth· 
nic bias in their courts. See JUDITH RESNIK, ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS OF COURTS AND 
ORGANIZATIONS OF JUDGES AND BAR ASSOCIATIONS CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS OF 
GENDER, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN THE COURTS AND LEGAL PROFESSION 11-12 (Nov. 1995). 
The reports published in Florida, New Jersey, and New York recommended that police prac-
tices be monitored. See Amicus Brief of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund in Support of the 
Respondent in United States v. Armstrong, Appendix A, at 3a, 12a-13a. The reports pub-
lished in Georgia, Iowa, New York, and Oregon recommended that prosecutors' discretion-
ary decisions be documented and monitored. See id. app. A, at 5a-6a, Sa, 12a-13a, 15a. 
